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CONSOCIATIONALISM VS. INCENTIVISM IN DIVIDED
SOCIETIES: A QUESTION OF THRESHOLD
DESIGN OR OF SEQUENCING?
Clark B. Lombardi & Shamshad Pasarlay
ABSTRACT

Scholarship on constitutional design for post-conflict or
divided societies focuses a great deal of attention on two
issues: (1) the processes and timing by which constitutional
rules should be established and (2) whether constitutions
should reflect a consociationalist or incentivist approach to
governance. Scholars are increasinglywilling to entertain the
possibility that constitutions drafted during period of
transitionfrom civil war or authoritarianismneed not, and
often should not, answer immediately all questions that
constitutionstend to answer; however, they tend to assume that
the question of whether constitutions should be
consociationalist or incentivist is one that should not be
deferred. And, as a practicalmatter, most constitutions make
an initial choice between the two and seem to assume that the
initial choice will be a permanent one. This article explores
Afghanistan's constitutional history since the fall of the
Taliban. It argues that Afghanistan's history sheds light on the
strengths and weaknesses of consociationalism and
incentivism and provides tantalizing evidence that, as in
Afghanistan, people drafting democratic constitutions for a
post-conflict or divided society should have prescribed a
transitionfrom one type of governance to the other During a
period in which civil wars are raging in many continents and
post-conflict constitutions will need to be drafted, the lessons
ofAfghanistan should prove enormously valuable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the U.S. and international legal academy, there is
growing interest in questions of constitutional design for
post-conflict societies or for other divided societies undergoing
democratic transition. Recent scholarship in this field has focused
on several types of questions. Some works compare different types
of constitutional drafting processes and try to identify the ones
most likely to result in a successful constitution.' A second group
of works contrasts the different goals that constitution drafters
might aim for when they set out to draft an initial constitution for a
divided society. 2 Some suggest that drafters should avoid
answering in an initial constitution divisive questions about
national identity and government structure. 3 A third set of works
explores what types of government structure and voting process
are most likely to minimize societal divisions over time and lead
to an effective deliberative democracy.4 This article contributes to
1

See, e.g., Mark Tus net, Constitution Making: An Introduction, 91 TExAS L. R.
1983 (1984); John Lester, Forces and Mechanisms in the ConstitutionMaking
Process, 45 DUKE L. J. (1995); Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Drafting and
Distrust, 13 I-CON: THE INT'L J. CONST. L. 819 (2016).

2 Much

of this literature responds to the work of liberal constitutional theorists,
such as Bruce Ackerman, who have argued that the moment in which a country
emerges from a civil war, and/or overthrows an authoritarian regime, the
so-called "constitutional moment," really is the best time to write up a detailed
and entrenched constitution - one whose rules will be difficult to amend? See
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992). Among those

who challenge Ackerman are those who argue that, in divided societies, it is
advisable to draft a transitional constitution. For an overview of these critiques,
see Vicki C. Jackson, What's in a Name Reflections on Timing, Naming and
Constitution-Making, 49 WM & MARY L. R. 1249 (2008); See, e.g., Heinz Klug,
CONSTITUTING

DEMOCRACY:

LAW,

GLOBALIZATION

AND

SOUTH

AFRICA'S

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2000); Heinz Klug, Constitution-making,Democracy

and the "Civilizing" of IrreconcilableConflict: What Might We Learnfrom the
South African Model?, 25 WISC. INT'L L. J. (2007); ROTI TITLE, TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE (2008). Other critics have advocated for constitutional deferral, a
process by which drafters leave important questions open for later resolution. See,
e.g., HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES
(2011); see also CONSTITUTION WRITING, RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY (Ashli Bali

& Hanna Lerner eds., 2017).
3 Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding not to Decide: Deferral in
ConstitutionalDesign 9 INT'L J. CONSUL L. 636 (2011).
4 For an overview of this body of scholarship, see Suit Choudhry, Bridging
Comparative Politics and Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, in CONSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN FOR DIVIDED

Choudhry

ed.,

SOCIETIES:

2008),

and,

INTEGRATION

for examples,

OR ACCOMMODATION

see the

(Suit

contributions

in
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this third body of scholarship.
Scholars who focus on government structure and electoral
systems for divided societies have broken into two camps. One
group
insists
that the
only
feasible
approach
is
"consociationalism." 5 Opposed to this are scholars who argue that
consociationalism only exacerbates the problems that it is
supposed to solve. They prescribe, instead, an approach of
"centripetalism" or "incentivism" (this article will use the second
term). 6 Seeing their approaches as mutually exclusive,
consociationalists and incentivists have rejected the possibility that
one could ever create an effective hybrid.'
In recent years, some scholars have cautiously begun to
question whether the choice between a consociationalist and
incentivist system needs really be as stark as the leading scholars
in the field have suggested. Such outliers suggest that, in practice,
many divided societies do adopt constitutions that include both
consociational and incentivist elements, and some have suggested
this may be wise." It is beyond the scope of this article to
summarize the hybrid consociational-incentivist systems of
governance that these outliers have identified or to evaluate the
CONSTITUTIONAL

DESIGN

FOR

DIVIDED

SOCIETIES:

INTEGRATION

OR

ACCOMMODATION (Suit Choudhry ed., 2008).
5 See Arendt Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POLITICS 207
(1969); ARENDT LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER SHARING AND
MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008).
6 See generally DONALD HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985).

7 See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, in
DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 253, 261 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedon
eds., 2000).
8 See, e.g., Stefan Wolff, Review Essay: Building Democratic States after Conflict:
Institutional Design Revisited," 12 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 128-214, 137 (2010);

compare with Anna Jars tad, Power Sharing: Former Enemies in Joint
Government, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS IN PEACEBUILDING
(Anna Jars tad & Timothy D, Sisk eds., 2008),

PIPPA NORRIS, DRIVING

DEMOCRACY: DO POWER SHARING INSTITUTIONS WORK?

(2008),

Katia Papa

Gianni, Participation and State Legitimation, in BUILDING STATES TO BUILD
PEACE (Charles T. Call & V Wyeth eds., 2008), William Reno, Bottom-up State
building?, in BUILDING STATES TO BUILD PEACE (Charles T. Call & V Wyeth eds.,
2008), Mimi Soderbergh-Kovacs, When Rebels Change Their Stripes: Armed
Insurgents in Post War Politics, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS IN
PEACEBUILDING (Anna Jarstad & Timothy D, Sisk eds., 2008), Stephen Tierney,

Giving with One Hand: Scottish Devolution within a Unitary State, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Choudhry ed., 2008); cf John Ejobowah,
Integrationist and Accommodationist Measures in Nigeria's Constitutional
Engineering: Successes and Failures, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Choudhry
ed., 2008).
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viability of such systems. This article will, thus, assume that
hybrids are, indeed, unworkable. It will explore, instead, another
possible approach to compromise - constitutional sequencing.
To date, few, if any, countries have written constitutions that
prescribe a "sequence" from a consociational system of
government to an incentivist one, or vice versa.9 Drawing on the
experience of Afghanistan, this article will argue that under some
circumstances, this type of sequencing may be the only viable
option. Part II of this article outlines the current state of the debate
about constitutional design for a democratizing divided society.
Part III describes the constitutional experience of Afghanistan
since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Part III asks what lessons can
be drawn from this history. It concludes that, on its face,
Afghanistan's recent experience is a sobering one. It supports
much of the criticism that consociationalists level at incentivism;
but, at the same time, it supports the incentivists' critique of
consociationalism. Recent Afghan history suggests that each party
has leveled damning criticism at the other, without offering a
viable alternative. From this, a pessimist might conclude that
divided societies simply cannot be governed democratically. Part
IV argues such a conclusion would be premature. Whether or not
their constitutions formally require it, divided democratizing
countries can, and occasionally do, switch from one approach to
another. In Afghanistan's case, an extra-constitutional, ad-hoc
move from incentivism to consociationalism has not solved
Afghanistan's deeper problem. This forces us to ask, however,
whether divided societies like Afghanistan might benefit from a
constitutionally-mandated switch in the other direction - from
consociationalist to incentivist government.

II. SCHOLARSHIP ON DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTIONS FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES
Interest in divided societies has grown steadily in recent
9 Ginsburg and Dixon point to one case study in which a country resolved a debate

about consociational versus incentivist structures by a constitutional "revisit"
approach. The initial constitution included provisions that reflected an incentivist
philosophy, as well as a provision calling for the country after a period of time to
review those provisions and, if they had been counterproductive, to abandon
them for consociationalist provisions. Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 651
(discussing Brazil's 1988 Constitution).
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decades. It was initially provoked questions about the mixed
record that formerly authoritarian European countries racked up
during the last quarter of the twentieth century as they tried to
move from authoritarian to democratic governance.' 0 In those
decades, a number of European countries abandoned authoritarian
forms of government in favor of a democratic parliamentary form
of government either on the Westminster model or a modified
Westminster model. " Only some of these transplantations,
however, resulted in effective democratization. Those that took
place in the 1970s and 80s tended almost uniformly to be
successful, resulting in parliamentary democracies with strong
legitimacy and effective governance; by contrast, the democratic
transitions that took place in Central and Eastern Europe after the
fall of the Soviet Union often failed.12
When scholars sought to explain the different outcomes in
different countries, they noticed an interesting pattern.
Westminster/quasi-Westminster parliamentary democracies tended
to succeed in countries that were not "divided societies" and
tended to fail in countries that were "divided societies." A divided
society, as they saw it, was one in which two factors are
simultaneously in play. First, the polity is diverse. Second,
crucially, its diverse ethno-cultural, religious, or other
communities are politically mobilized.1 3 That is to say, political
and economic decisions are dictated primarily by a person's
communal identity. In other words, a citizen's primary loyalty is to
her community rather than to her fellow citizens. In such a society,
citizens can reliably be expected to vote only for a candidate who
came from their community. Once in office, an elected official
tends to promote the interests only of citizens who belong to her
community.' 4 In a series of works, scholars like Arend Lijphart
and Donald Horowitz explained convincingly why Westminster
parliamentary democracy tended to fail in divided societies. They
disagreed, however, on the solution to the problem. That is to say,
10 See Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics, supra note
4, at 5.

" On the distinctions between these, see generally Bruce Ackerman, The New
Separation ofPowers, 113 Harv. L.R. 633 (2000).
12 Arend Lijphart, The Wave ofPower-SharingDemocracy, in THE ARCHITECTURE
OF DEMOCRACY:
13
14

CONSTITUTIONAL

DESIGN,

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT,

AND

DEMOCRACY 37 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002).

Ian Lustick, Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Constitutionalism versus

Control, 31 WORLD POLITICS 325, 325 (1979).
See Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics, supra note
4, at 5; Lustick,
supra note 13, at 325.
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they disagreed on the question of what sort of democratic political
system would succeed in the divided societies that could not be
governed by Westminster-style parliamentary democracy.
In a Westminster system, elections to parliament take place
on the basis of single-member, plurality voting, also referred to as
"first-past-the-post" or FPTP voting." (Each registered voter in a
defined area is allotted one vote, which they can cast for their
preferred candidate. At the conclusion of the election, the
candidate with the most votes wins.) Usually, though not always, a
single party commands a majority in the legislature. The majority
party (or coalition) selects the prime minister, who serves as head
of the executive branch, along with the rest of the cabinet. Such a
system is well suited to produce stable elected governments for a
society that is not communally "divided." In such societies,
electoral losers are willing to accept the legitimacy of the overall
political system because they feel that the system is not
irretrievably rigged against them. Parties differentiate themselves
on the basis of policy, and a party that loses an election can tweak
its policy platform in future years to win votes from people who
had previously voted for their opponents. A party that loses in one
year can reasonably expect to win a future election and thus has an
incentive not to resist election results by force. Conversely, parties
in power govern in full knowledge that they will at some point
lose; and, accordingly, the party in power at any particular point in
time has incentives not to abuse its power.1 6 By contrast, a
Westminster-style parliamentary system is unlikely to produce a
stable democratic regime in a divided society. This is because in a
divided society parties associated with a minority group may
reasonably doubt that they will ever win a democratic election. In
these societies, people tend to vote on the basis of their ethnicity
(which never changes) or religious affiliation (which tends to
change slowly, if at all). A party or coalition that runs candidates
from a majority community and promotes the interests of that
community will be able to win every election, no matter how
abusive their policies are.17 By extension, parties representing the
interests of minority communities will permanently be excluded
from political office, and members of their community will suffer.
15

Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics, supranote 4, at 17.

16 See id.
17 AREND

LIJPHART,

DEmOCRACY

IN

PLURAL

SOCIETIES:

A

COMPARATIVE

EXPLORATION 3-4 (1977), compare with Choudhry, Bridging Comparative
Politics, supra note 4, at 17.
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In such a system, the interests of minority communities, even large
ones, can be ignored. Since minority groups cannot protect their
interests through the regular political process, members of small
communities cease to see the advantage of participating in the
democratic process at all. When possible, they resort to
extra-constitutional resistance, and in many cases civil war breaks
out. Lijphart said in 1985 that for all practical purposes, when it
comes to the members of a minority community in a divided
society, Westminster democracy is basically "no democracy at
all,"' and Horowitz agreed.' 9
Seeing that Westminster and quasi-Westminster democracy
are doomed to fail in a divided society, scholars like Lijphart and
Horowitz struggled to imagine a different type of democratic
system that might fare better. All agreed that effective democratic
constitutions will have to address three distinctive challenges. 20
Great care must be taken to ensure that (1) an elected government
will be trusted by all communities and will represent the interests
of all; (2) the political system will encourage, over time, political
cooperation across community lines - cooperation of a sort that is
likely to build further trust between members of rival communities;
and, (3) the experience of electing governments and being
governed under them will, ideally, lead people to value their
identity as citizens of the diverse state as much as they value their
identity as members of their ethnic or religious community.
If they agreed on the qualities that the government of a
divided society should have, however, Lijphart and Horowitz
disagreed deeply about what sort of government would best realize
those qualities. Each championed a very different approach to
electing and organizing the government of a divided society.

A. Rival Solutions: Consociationalism vs. Incentivism
Scholars of divided societies have proposed two contrasting
2
approaches to democratic governance in a divided society. 1 A
18 See AREND LIPHART, POWER-SHARING IN SOUTH AFRICA

13

(1985).

19 Donald Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and ConstitutionalProcesses in
Post Conflict States, 49 WILLIAM & MARY L. R. 1213, 1215 (2008).

For a discussion of some questions, see generally Clark B. Lombardi

&

20

Shamshad Pasarlay, Constitution-Making for Divided Societies: Lessons from
Afghanistan, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEXT (David Law ed., forthcoming
21

2019).
See, e.g., Katherine Belmont, Scott Mainwaring & Andrew
Reynolds,
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group of scholars, associated with Lijphart and his students, insist
that divided societies can be governed democratically only
through a form of "consociational" government. 22 The argument
for consociationalism is premised on the idea that divided societies
are most likely to be governed democratically when the
constitution establishes a structure of government and election
rules that together guarantee each of the country's politically
important communities the ability to influence government
policies in areas of serious concern to the community. 23
According to Lijphart and like-minded scholars, consociational
government is absolutely necessary whenever one community in a
divided society has more than 50% of the voting population and
can effectively govern. Consociational government is effective in
many other types of divided society too.
What is consociational government? Such governments
always include a grand coalition executive, meaning that all
important rival groups should be included and allowed to exercise
some meaningful power in government. 24 It usually includes, as
well, segmental autonomy in either a territorial or corporate
form. 25 That is to say, the state will delegate power to a territory
that is dominated by a particular community or alternatively it will
guarantee a certain degree of executive or legislative power to
community leaders. Through such mechanisms communities gain
control over issues of particular concern to them. Two additional
features that consociationalists often favor are mutual veto rights
on matters of vital importance to rival communities and
proportionality in political representation, including in the
legislature, civil service appointments, and the allocation of public
funds. 26 By giving mutually distrustful communities guarantees of
political power, usually including veto rights, Lijphart's
"consociational" model of governance tries to create the
Institutional Design,
ARCHITECTURE

OF

Conflict Management and Democracy,
DEMOCRACY:

CONSTITUTIONAL

DESIGN,

in

TiH-E

CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002); Choudhry,
Bridging Comparative Politics, supra note 4.
22 See, e.g., LIPHART, supra note
18.
23 Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEMOCRACY
96, 97 (2004).
24 LIPHART, supra note 18, at 25-47.
25 Id.
26 See Id. at 25-47; Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 188-89 (Joel Krieger ed., 1993);

compare with Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics, supra note 4, at 18-19.
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conditions in which communities will be willing, however
grudgingly, to work together. This will hopefully allow these
communities to experience the benefits of cooperating rather than
fighting. On this foundation, consociationalists argue, trust and
more effective cooperation can be built. Over time, ideally,
consociational guarantees will no longer be needed.
Challenging the claims of consociationalists are "incentivists,"
a group associated with Donald Horowitz and his students.
Incentivists reject consociationalism as impractical and ultimately
counterproductive. 27 They point out that in many divided societies,
important communities have little incentive to participate in a
consociational democracy. 28 Most importantly, if any communal
group in a country makes up more than 50% of the population,
that group will rarely have any reason to agree to a consociational
compromise. Incentivists argue, therefore, that consociation is
likely to be accepted only where (1) minorities have taken up arms
and have forced a majority group to compromise or where (2)
there is no clear majority and when the structure of government
precludes coalitions of ethnic groups from cooperating politically
to the detriment of others. 29 Furthermore, even in these rare cases,
some parties will come to regret their agreement to participate in
consociational government. For example, if a majority is
compelled by violence to accept a consociational form of
governance, that majority is likely to resent the situation going
forward and to undermine or repudiate the consociational bargain
as soon as it thinks it has the military power to impose its will. In
countries with no dominant community, consociationalism might
last longer. In such countries, however, incentivists argue that
consociational government always devolves over time in a way
that renders the government ineffective, illegitimate, or both. 30
See generally Donald Horowitz, Democracy in Divided Societies, 4 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 18 (1993). For a detailed response to Horowitz's criticisms, see
Lijphart, The Wave ofPower-SharingDemocracy, supra note 12, at 40-45.
28 Horowitz, ConstitutionalDesign, supra
note 7, at 20.
29 Horowitz, ConciliatoryInstitutions and ConstitutionalProcesses,
supra note 19,
at 40-48; Choudhry, supra note 4, at 20.
27

30

In consociational democracies, the electoral systems are structured in a way that
guarantees that communities will be represented by a member of their own
community, and this person is understood to be the figure who will have
responsibility for promoting their interests against the interests of other
communities. Members of a particular community thus have every incentive to
make sure that this seat is held by someone who will represent their interests most

vigorously. Choudhry, Bridging ComparativePolitics, supranote 4, at 20-21.
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For one, federalism and proportional representation (PR) in
parliamentary elections each tend to result in the election of
extremists rather than moderates from rival ethnic or religious
parties. 31Furthermore, minority vetoes tend to be abused and to
promote gridlock that will in turn lead people to question the
effectiveness and legitimacy of their government.
To incentivists like Horowitz, then, consociationalism is a
poor solution to the problem of democratic governance in a
divided society. It is unlikely to be adopted in the first place, and,
where it is adopted, it will exacerbate the communal tensions that
it is supposed to solve. 3 2 Instead of dividing political offices
among people based on the community that they come from, the
system should reward parties and politicians who are willing to
reach out to members of communities outside their own and
establish policies that promote the interests of people who belong
to rival communities. As an alternative to consociation,
incentivists propose that divided societies establish highly
centralized, unitary governments headed by a strong president.
Importantly, however, those presidents must be elected through
voting systems that benefit moderate politicians who are able and
willing to work with politicians representing rival communities. 33
What voting systems are likely to incentivize moderate
politicians to seek votes from members of other communities and
likely to provide moderates with more votes from other
communities than they lose from communal extremists who
abandon them? The best such system was said to be the
"alternative vote: system" (AV).34 The possibility of vote transfers
in such a system encourages candidates to appeal for support
across ethnic lines. It thus creates incentives for moderation.
The battle between consociationalists and incentivists
continues to resonate to this day, both within the academy and
31 PR systems penalize rather than incentivize moderate political behavior across

ethnic lines.

32 Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, supra note 7, at 256-257.
33 DONALD HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA?: CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY 461 (1991).

34 In such a system, voters are asked to rank candidates in order of preference. If

no candidate is successful after first preferences have been counted, the bottom
candidate is dropped from the ballot and votes cast for that candidate are
distributed according to the second preferences. AV gives parties that represent a
majority community a compelling reason to seek votes from members of
minority communities. Doing so will allow them to get an absolute majority
through second preferences.
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among people who draft constitutions for divided societies.

B. Must a Constitution Choose
Consociationalism or Incentivism?
No constitution ever answers all possible questions about the
nature of the country or the structure of government. Some
scholars have suggested that, in divided societies emerging from
crisis, constitutions should not provide answers to the most
divisive questions about national identity, rights, or, even
sometimes, governmental structure.35 To this end, some scholars
have proposed drafting "transitional constitutions" designed to
operate for only a short period of time, after which they will be
replaced by a permanent constitution. 36 Even if people feel
compelled to draft a permanent constitution at the outset, they can
draft it in a way that 'defers' on important questions. 37 That is to
say, drafters can identify questions that are particularly divisive at
the time of drafting and can delegate to the political branches the
power to resolve those questions in the future - simply by enacting
a law to deal with the issue. Alternatively, those who draft
constitutions for a divided society can choose in places to use
deliberately ambiguous language, leaving it for constitutional
interpreters (possibly legislators and possibly judges) to resolve
the divisive issues at a later date. 38
As we have discussed in another work, scholars have in
recent years produced a number of interesting works on
constitutional deferral. Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon have
used large (n) studies to create typologies of deferral and to draw
some initial lessons about which types of deferral are productive
and which are likely instead to create stress and potentially shorten
the lifespan of a constitutional regime.39 Lombardi, Pasarlay,
Lerner, and Bali have each used case studies to explain why under
certain conditions, certain types of divided societies have
benefited from a practice of constitutional deferral. 40 Taken
35 LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS,
WRITING, RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY

supra note 2; see also CONSTITUTION

(Asli Bali & Hanna Lerner eds., 2017).

36 See the texts in supra note 2 above.
37

Hanna Lerner, Constitution Writing in Deeply Divided Societies: The

IncrementalistApproach 16 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 68 (2010).
38 Lombardi & Pasarlay, supra note 20.
39 See Ginsburg & Dixon, supra note 3.
40 Clark B. Lombardi, The Constitution as Agreement to Agree:
The Social and
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together, these studies suggest that deferral can, under certain
circumstances, make sense. Sounding a cautionary note, however,
Dixon and Ginsburg point out that deferral can also overtax
political institutions. 41 While more case studies are needed, the
limited evidence available suggests that a divided society which
aspires to be ruled democratically may reasonably choose to defer
on a number of questions, but it should resolve very early (in the
constitution or shortly afterwards) the question of whether the
state should be governed according to a philosophy of
consociationalism or incentivism.42
Certainly, at the time they sat down to write a new
constitution in 2004, Afghanistan's elites shared the intuitions of
Ginsburg and Dixon. Apparently feeling that the choice of
consociationalism vs. incentivism was an either/or choice, they
debated and selected one approach to governance - one that,
supposedly, they expected to apply indefinitely. Ultimately, they
chose an incentivist system. Afghanistan's experience living under
that system sheds important light on the relative advantages of
consociationalism or incentivism for divided societies, and it
suggests an innovative new approach to constitutional drafting that
might allow countries over time to enjoy the best of each system.

III. AFGHANISTAN'S RECENT
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Afghanistan provides us with a textbook example of a state

Political Foundations (and Effects) of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, in THE
&

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 398 (Dennis Galligan

Mila Versteeg eds., 2013), Shamshad Pasarlay, "Making the 2004 Constitution of
Afghanistan: A History and Analysis through the Lens of Coordination and
Deferral Theory" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington School of Law,
2016); Ash Bili & Hanna Lerner, ConstitutionalDesign without Constitutional
Moment: Lessons from Religiously Divided Societies, 49 CORNELL INT'L. L. J.
227 (2016); Shamshad Pasarlay, Rethinking Afghanistan's Longest-Lived
Constitution: The 1931 Constitution through the Lens of Constitutional
Endurance andPerformanceLiterature, 10 ELON L. REV. 283 (2016).

To illustrate the problem, Ginsburg and Dixon point to the example of Iraq after
the U.S. Invasion of 2003, which illustrates, to their minds, the dangers of
deferral on questions of voting systems-a deferral that leaves open the question
of whether the government will be consociational or incentivist. See Ginsburg
&

41

Dixon, supra note 3, at 661-665.
42 Id.
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that is supposed to regulate a deeply divided polity. From the time
Afghanistan was recognized as a nation in the late 1 9 th century, its
citizens have identified with one of a multitude of distinct
communities - ethnic communities, linguistic communities, and
religious communities. 43 Communal identity has always had
political salience. Afghans have tended to trust members of their
community more than members of other communities. And their
trust has generally been rewarded. Leaders have generally
promoted the interests of the communities from which they

hailed. 44
Communal divisions deepened during 25 years of civil war
between 1976 and 2001, a period in which communities came to
rely on their communal militias for protection. 4 5 In 2001, U.S.-led
forces invaded Afghanistan; and, in the wake of this invasion, the
international community sought to help Afghans establish a
democratic government. 46 After years of communal fighting,
Afghans tended to look to the leaders of communal militias or
figures close to these leaders. They looked to these figures to
represent their interests in the new government.
From 2001 to 2004, representatives of Afghanistan's
mistrustful communities drafted, debated, and ratified a
constitution that was supposed to usher in a period of democratic
governance.

A. The Drafting of Afghanistan's 2004 Constitution
In 2001 after the invasion of Afghanistan by an international
force led by the United States, the international community
43 Among the various major Afghan ethnic/linguistic groups are the Pashtuns and

Tajiks (the two largest) followed by Hazaras, Uzbeks, and a host of smaller, but
regionally significant, minorities, such as Baluch and Turkmen. VARTAN
GREGORIAN, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AFGHANISTAN: POLITICS OF REFORM
AND MODERNIZATION, 1880-1946, 25-38 (1967). THOMAS J. BARFIELD,
AFGHANISTAN: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 23-32 (2010). (In addition,

Afghanistan is deeply divided along religious lines. Even within a single ethnic
group, one can find communities embracing different sects (Sunni or Shi' a); and,
within a particular sect, one can find dramatically different approaches to the
faith. See generally AFGHANISTAN'S ISLAM: FROM CONVERSION TO THE TALIBAN
xiii (Nile Green ed., 2016).
44 See Lombardi & Pasarlay, Constitution-Making, supra note 20.
45
See generally LARRY GOODSON, AFGHANISTAN'S ENDLESS WAR (2001); see
WILLIAM MALEY, THE AFGHANISTAN WARS (2009).

also

46 See Barnett Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, 15 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 5 (2004).
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committed itself to promote a new regime of stable, democratic
government in Kabul. With the assistance of powerful
international actors, a meeting was held in Bonn, Germany, where
powerful figures represented a variety of mutually hostile
communities with militias. 47
At the meeting in Germany, the participants signed a
power-sharing agreement, the Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions, commonly known as the
Bonn Agreement. 48 This Agreement set a timetable for a two-year
transitional period in which a transitional administration would be
set up and would supervise the drafting of a new constitution. 49
Hamid Karzai, the hereditary head of a Pashtun tribe that had been
active in Afghanistan's civil war, was appointed president of the
Transitional Administration.
In October 2002, Karzai appointed by decree a nine-member
commission to prepare the first draft of the constitution.5 0 The
nine-member Constitutional Drafting Commission (CDC)
included representatives from the most powerful political and
military factions in Afghanistan, except for the Taliban. Its
members represented groups with different and rival ideological,
political, ethnic and regional commitments." The CDC identified
a number of key questions of constitutional design that would
ideally be resolved before a constitution was drafted. These
included (1) if and how power should be separated - both
horizontally or vertically; (2) whether the state should recognize
Islam as an official religion, if so, how specifically should the state
identify the particular version of Islam that would serve as the
official religion, and should principles embedded in the official
religion constrain the legislative, executive, or judicial discretion
of the state; (3) what fundamental rights should the state be
47 J. Alexander Thier, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 NEW YORK
LAw SCHOOL LAW REVIEW 557, 559 (2006-07).
48 Id.
49 Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Agreement on

Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions, transmitted to the Security Council by the
Secretary-General, Art. I: 6, U.N. DOC. S/2001/1154, 1155 (Dec. 5, 2001),

http:/www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan-agree.html.
50 Decree No. 141 of the President of the Transitional Administration of

Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, on the Appointment of the Constitutional Drafting
5

Commission (Oct. 2002).
Thier, supra note 47, 566-567.
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obliged to respect; and, finally, (4) what institutions should be
entrusted with the power to interpret and enforce the
constitution.12

Failing to form a minimum consensus on the last three
questions, and worried that time was running out, the CDC
decided temporarily to defer consideration of these questions. This
decision enabled the members of the commission to prepare a first
draft of a constitution - albeit one with significant lacunae. Karzai
then appointed a larger Constitutional Review Commission (CRC),
which revised the CDC draft and submitted it to a Constitutional
Loya Jirga (CLJ) - a constituent assembly that would have the
authority to debate, revise if necessary, and ultimately adopt
Afghanistan's first constitution of the twenty-first century in
2004.53
In revising the CDC's initial draft constitution, the
Constitutional Review Commission remained deeply divided on
questions of Islam, national values, and judicial review. In another
work, Pasarlay has recently discussed in detail how the deadlock
was broken only when the CRC agreed to engage in constitutional
deferral, leaving unanswered a number of controversial questions
about Islam, rights, and judicial review.54 Because the political
branches were given enormous freedom to answer questions that
would normally be answered in a constitutional text, the CRC felt
compelled to design carefully the country's political institutions.
The CRC debated at length questions of government structure and
electoral
system.
After
much
discussion,
it
rejected
consociationalism and prescribed for the country an incentivist
style of government.
To understand the debate within the CRC and the
Commission's final decision, it is important to remember that in
Afghanistan Pashtuns are slightly under 50% of the population.
Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek communities make up most of the
remainder, alongside some smaller communities.
Everyone
assumed, correctly it turns out, that voting in post-Taliban
Lombardi & Pasarlay, supra note 20.
53 Pasarlay, "Making the 2004 Constitution," supra note 40, at 172-255;
Shamshad Pasarlay, The Limits of ConstitutionalDeferral: Lessons from the
History of the 2004 Constitution ofAfghanistan, 27 WASHINGTON INT'L. L. J. 683
52

(2018).

54 See

generally Lombardi & Pasarlay, supra note 20; Pasarlay, Limits of
Constitutional Deferral, supra note 53.
5 BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: supra note 43, at 23-32.

YONSEI LAW JOURNAL

92

[vol. 9

Afghanistan would proceed as it typically does in divided societies,
with members of a community invariably voting for candidates
who came from their community. At both the CRC and, eventually
at the CLJ, the popular body that formally adopted the 2004
Constitution, members allied with the Pashtun acting president,
Hamid Karzai, predictably favored a strong presidential system
with a president elected by a simple majority/plurality. They
assumed that Pashtuns, who were the largest ethno-linguistic
community in Afghanistan, would vote uniformly for a Pashtun
president. A Pashtun would always hold the presidency; and, in
order to maintain his support among fellow community members,
s/he would promote their interests at the expense of others.5 6 For
obvious reasons, members of other communities were skeptical
about a strong presidency elected through a simple
majority/plurality vote. 57 They insisted that the constitution
should include provisions to soften the impact of a permanent
Pashtun presidency. They were internally divided, however, on
whether the constitution should achieve this end by adopting
consociational guarantees or, instead, by requiring incentivist
voting systems.
Some CRC non-Pashtun members wanted to include a
number of consociational elements in the government. 58 For
example, federalism or expansive grants of regional autonomy
were proposed. 59 Among the CRC members who favored such
provisions, some also wanted to use a form of list PR to elect the
legislature. 60 Others pushed for communal vetoes over important
issues of concern for minority groups. Finally, some proposed a
semi-presidential model with the prime-ministership reserved for a
non-Pashtun. 61 Partly on their own and partly after pressure from
56 Golnaz Esfandiari, Loya JirgaApproves Constitution, But HardPartMay Have
Only
Just
Begun,
RADIO
FREE
EUROPE,
2004,
https://www.rferl.org/a/1340558.html(accessed Dec. 4, 2018).
5 Id.
58 Pasarlay, "Making the 2004 Constitution," supra note 40, at 231-34.
59 During the civil war, Afghanistan effectively had been partitioned into regions

controlled by 'warlords.' It was felt that delegations of de jure power to regions
would be, for all practical purposes, delegations of de jure power to warlords and
might embolden them to threaten the government or to push for secession. The
framers believed that a centralized state with a powerful president at its head
could counter the influence of powerful warlords and help hold the country
together.
60 Andrew Reynolds, ElectoralSystems Today: The Curious Case ofAfghanistan,
17 J. DEMOCRACY 104, 106 (2006).
61

Pasarlay,

"Making the 2004 Constitution," supra note 40, at 174-235
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the international community, a majority of the members of the CLJ
rejected almost all of these consociational proposals. 62 Echoing
the arguments of incentivists like Donald Horowitz, a majority of
CRC members ultimately concluded that consociational
arrangements would politicize ethnic differences and threaten
Afghanistan's fragile stability. Instead of granting consociational
guarantees, then, they instead put their faith in incentivism.63
Among its incentivist strategies, the 2004 constitution
prohibits ethnic and sectarian political parties. 64 This rule was
designed to encourage multiethnic political parties, with the hope
that this would encourage institutions that promoted compromise
among political leaders from different communities. Similarly, the
government rejected a proportional electoral system, which
facilitates segmental appeals.65 Instead, the constitution requires
the president to run with two vice-presidential candidates. 66 In
theory, a team with representatives from three different ethnic and
sectarian groups should always beat a team that had
representatives from less than three. In the most likely scenario,
the president would be from the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns,
while his vice-presidents would be from other ethnic groups
(chiefly, the Tajiks, Uzbeks, or Hazaras). Such a system
encourages pre-election pacts across ethnic and sectarian lines that
would promote political allegiances that transcend groups. It
would also lead the president from the largest ethnic groups to
moderate his/her behavior while in office and require the
vice-presidential candidates to do exactly the same for their
political pacts.
(discussing the post of a prime minister in the earlier drafts of the 2004
constitution).
62 Western powers wanted Afghanistan to be governed by a strong
executive who
had unilateral discretion to sign agreements with foreign countries. Without such
a figure at the center of the government, Western powers indicated they might be
unable or unwilling to finance Afghanistan's rebuilding or negotiate the terms
under which Western powers would provide security in the new state. On this
point, see the discussions in ZALMAY KHALILZAD THE ENVOY: FROM KABUL TO
THE WHITE HOUSE, MY JOURNEY THROUGH A TURBULENT WORLD (2016).

The few exceptions were limited ones designed to answer non-negotiable
demands by smaller ethnic and religious minorities such as the Uzbeks and the
primarily Shi' a Hazara. For example, the constitution includes limited provisions
for the devolution of power to localities and gives Shi' a the right to be governed
by a special family law.
64 Constitution of Afghanistan,
Art. 35.
65 Reynolds, supranote 60,
at 107.
66 Constitution of Afghanistan,
Art. 60.
63
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Finally, and most importantly, the presidential ticket is to be
elected according to a majority run-off system. 67 This is not an
alternative vote (AV) which Horowitz proposed, but one designed
to achieve similar goals. If no candidate wins 50% plus one of the
votes, the constitution also requires a second run-off election
between the number one and number two finishers. 68 As Lijphart
has noted, for all practical purposes, AV simply accomplishes in
one round of voting what requires two ballots in the
majority-run-off system. 69 As in AV, in majority run-off, the lower
ranked candidates are eliminated in the first round, and the leading
two candidates, who go through to the run-off, have to compete
for the votes of the eliminated candidates in the first round. The
competition for these votes in the run-off should result in political
pacts before the second run-off, thereby leading to moderate
behavior on the part of the front-runners.
The decision to adopt an incentivist structure of government
rather than a consociational was contested, albeit unsuccessfully.
The CRC draft could only become law after being debated and
ratified by the CLJ, an elected body that served as the official
constituent assembly. CLJ members representing minority
communities opposed the draft constitution precisely because it
contained almost no consociational guarantees. In particular, they
protested the decision to adopt a strong presidential system, rather
than a semi-presidential system in which the prime minister would
be a non-Pashtun. 70 Ultimately, the CLJ agreed to ratify the
constitution, but only on the express condition that the decision to
adopt a presidential system would be revisited after two to three
terms-and, if appropriate, the constitution would be amended to
include a post for a prime minister. President Karzai gave a speech
stating that he accepted this condition and that the review would
take place, and the constitution passed.71 Nevertheless, the promise
to reconsider the question of semi-presidential government was
the only nod towards consociationalism in the 2004 constitution.

67

Constitution of Afghanistan, Art. 61.

68 Id.

69 Lijphart, The Wave of Power-SharingDemocracy, supra note 12, at 48.
70 Pasarlay, "Making the 2004 Constitution," supranote 40, at 233; Hamid Karzai,

"Address to the Constitutional Loya Jirga Closing Session by the President of the
Transitional Administration of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai" (Jan. 4, 2004).
71 Pasarlay, "Making the 2004 Constitution," supra note 40, at 233.
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B. The Failure of Incentivism and
Incremental Embrace of Consociation
As good as they may have seemed on paper, Afghanistan's
incentivist institutions failed to achieve the results that
Afghanistan's constitution-makers had hoped. Apparently,
communal enmities had hardened so much during the course of
the brutal civil war of the 1990s that they simply could not be
overcome. Although the 2004 constitution largely rejects
consociationalism in favor of incentivism, the leaders of
Afghanistan's rival communities never really trusted government
officials to represent the interests of anyone other than members of
their own community. 72 In practice, a de facto system of
consociational democracy emerged, and recently the country has
taken a large step towards formalizing that turn to
consociationalism. 73
Because no community has an overwhelming demographic
majority in Afghanistan and because minority groups are heavily
armed, consociationalism looks attractive to many Afghans.74 And
notwithstanding the constitution's rejection of it, de-facto
consociationalism began to appear. Despite significant efforts by
candidates to moderate their language and platforms and reach out
to ethnic groups other than their own, voters in both legislative
and presidential elections remained unswayed. Recent data shows
that in legislative elections they continue almost uniformly to cast
their votes for candidates of their own ethnicity and religion.
Because Hazaras and Uzbeks tend to vote as their communal
leaders recommend, Hazara and Uzbek leaders tended to offer
their support to candidates from their community or-in regions
where they were a minority-to candidates who were willing to
support the programs of their communities' representatives in
parliament.7sNot surprisingly, despite the constitution's clear
prohibition of ethnic and sectarian political parties, de facto ethnic

72

Lombardi & Pasarlay, supra note 20.

73 See Afghan Leaders Sign Power Sharing Deal, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 21, 2014,

https ://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/21/afghanistan-power-sharing-de
al-abdullah-ashraf-ghani-ahmadzai.
74 See the discussion above in the text accompanying notes 55-57.
5 Mohammad Bashir Mobasher, Understanding Ethnic-Electoral Dynamics:
How Ethnic Politics Affect Electoral Laws and Election Outcomes in
Afghanistan, 51 GONZAGAL. R. 355, 355-415 (2016).
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and sectarian political parties began to emerge.76
A similar pattern has held true in presidential elections:
individuals mostly cast their votes for the candidate of their own
ethnic and sectarian group. 77 To stand a chance of winning, one
must be a member of one of Afghanistan's two largest ethnic
groups, the Pashtuns and Tajiks. Members of smaller communities,
such as the Hazaras and Uzbeks, vote only for candidates who
have nominated a member of their community as a vice-president.
Hazara and Uzbek leaders have formed political pacts with former
Pashtun president, Hamid Karzai, not because Karzai was
moderate on divisive issues but because Karzai was likely to win
and offered them powerful positions in his cabinet - effectively
offering them a share of executive power that they could use to
ensure that they had a say in policy-making.7 1
Notwithstanding the constitution-makers' rejection of
consociationalism, presidential cabinets now take the form, for all
practical purposes, of grand coalitions with representatives from
nearly all ethnic and sectarian groups whose leaders would enter
into a political pact with the president of the state. As a culture of
de facto consociationalism took root, the government has taken
steps to involve all sizable communities in executive institutions
and promote proportionality in the bureaucracy. 79
The drift towards de facto consociationalism has led to
something more dramatic - the establishment of a de jure
consociationalist presidency. 80 The majority winner-take-all
electoral system adopted to elect presidents in Afghanistan created
severe crisis every time the country has had a presidential
election."i Its most recent 2014 presidential election led to a
76 For instance,

the

Junbish-i Islami

Afghanistan

(Islamic Movement of

Afghanistan) is almost exclusively an Uzbek ethnic political party. The Hizb-i
Wahdat-ilslamiis another ethno-sectarian party - comprised only of the Hazara
and the Shia populations of Afghanistan.
7 Mohammad Bashir Mobasher, Electoral Choices, Ethnic Accommodations and

the Consolidation of Coalitions: Critiquing the Runoff Clauses of the Afghan
Constitution, 26 WASHINGTON INT'L L. J. 413 (2017).
Lombardi & Pasarlay, supra note 20.
79 See generally Mobasher, supra note 75; Mobasher, supra note 77.
80 Afghan Leaders Sign PowerSharing Deal, THE GUARDIAN, supra note 73.
81 Shamshad Pasarlay, Mohammad Qadamshah & Clark B. Lombardi, Reforming
the Afghanistan Electoral System: The CurrentDebate and Its Implicationsfor
the Plans to Amend the Afghan Constitution, I-CONNECT: BLOG OF THE
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, May
8, 2015,
7

http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/05/reforming-the-afghan-electoral-system-t
he-current-debate-and-its-implications-for-the-plans-to-amend-the-afghan-const
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political crisis that put the country on the brink of violent civil war
and partition when both second-round candidates, Ashraf Ghani, a
Pashtun candidate, and Abdullah, a Tajik candidate, claimed
victory.8 2 Initially, Ashraf Ghani was declared the winner of the
second round of the elections. However, Abdullah and his
supporters, mostly powerful Tajik elites, accused the Independent
Electoral Commission (IEC) of systematic fraud, corruption, and
electoral engineering. In the end, they declared that the IEC was
illegitimate and preemptively refused to recognize any finding that
he had lost.83 Thereafter, Abdullah and his supporters engaged in
street protests and threatened violence in case the IEC did not revise
the result. The Pashtuns in turn protested in support of Ashraf
Ghani in many provinces. The stalemate makes clear that, going
forward, neither of Afghanistan's leading communal groups is
willing to relinquish their claim to the powerful presidency and see
it occupied by the other group no matter how moderate the
candidates are.
Although the U.S. had lobbied strenuously in 2004 to prevent
a consociationalist government, the 2014 crisis was finally
resolved through a US-brokered power-sharing agreement that
resulted in what is, for all practical purposes, a consociationalist
presidency.8 4 The power-sharing agreement created a government
of national unity and provided that Ghani would be recognized as
president of Afghanistan and Abdullah as its chief executive - a
position not envisioned in the 2004 Constitution. 85 The
vice-presidential candidates from two different ethnic groups who
had run on Abdullah's ticket were to be recognized as deputy chief
executive officers. The president would cooperate with the chief
executive in appointing ministers and setting policy. The cabinet
posts were henceforth to be equally divided between the president
and the chief executive who would appoint them with the consent
of their deputies from two other ethnic groups.8 6 Furthermore, the
parties agreed that the move towards consociationalism would not

itution/.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84
Agreement between the Two Campaign Teams Regarding the Structure of the

National
Unity
Government,
L.A.
TIMES,
Sept.
21,
2014,
http://documents.latimes.com/agreement-between-two-campaign-teams-regardi
ngstructure- national-unity-government/.

85 Id.

86 Id.
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be a one-off. To constitutionalize the move away from incentivism,
the president and the chief executive agreed to appoint a
commission to draft proposed amendments to the constitution that
will be debated and approved by a Loya Jirga, Afghanistan's
constitutional amendment convention.87
Taken together, Afghanistan's voting patterns, its practice of
allotting bureaucratic positions on a proportional basis, and its
2014 power-sharing agreement all suggest that Lijphart was on to
something. Afghanistan's ethnic and sectarian groups are simply
unwilling to accept a system that does not guarantee them the
chance to be represented by their own leaders. At the same time,
though, if Afghanistan seems to support Lijphart's claim that
consociationalism is a necessary evil in at least certain types of
divided societies, it may provide some support for Horowitz's
claim that it is not an effective long-term solution. The distrust that
leads Afghans to vote only for members of their own community
infects the leaders that they bring to power. The members of the
National Unity Government mistrust each other so much that they
have regularly failed to agree on questions that must, according to
the agreement, be reached by consensus. The result has been delay
and gridlock.""

IV. AFGHANISTAN'S LESSONS
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNERS
Afghanistan's
recent
constitutional
history provides
information that helps us evaluate some theories about
constitutional design for divided societies and suggest some
productive avenues for future research and experimentation. In
divided societies, political behavior is prone to follow ethnic and
religious lines. Thus, simple majoritarian democracy risks turning
into domination by a more populous ethnic or religious faction
over all others. 9 Because ethno-political groups apparently do not
trust each other, they find it hard to reach consensus on important
87 Pasarlay, Qadamshah & Lombardi, supra note 81.
8 See generallyMobasher, supra note 77; Richard Ghiasy, Afghanistan 's Political
Elite Continues to Jeopardize Stability STOCKHOLM PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE

https://www.sipri.org/con nentary/blog/2017/afghanistans-political-elite
(accessed Nov. 3, 2018).
89 Choudhry, Bridging ComparativePolitics, supranote 4, at 17.

BLOG,
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questions of public policy. The challenge is to create a system in
which all relevant communities feel sufficiently represented that
they will accept that their concerns are appreciated and rights
respected and as a result will accept governmental decisions as
legitimate.90
The drafters of Afghanistan's 2004 constitution considered
carefully whether they should institutionalize a consociational
form of government of the sort championed by Lijphart or, instead,
a government of the sort championed by Donald Horowitz and
like-minded 'incentivists.' 91 They deliberately adopted an
incentivist approach. Since that choice was made, Afghanistan's
history suggests that any initial and permanent choice in favor of
either of these propositions is likely to be problematic. The initial
choice in favor of an incentivist system failed to get 'buy-in' from
a critical mass of Afghanistan's communities over the short-to
medium-term. Because some of the dissenters were heavily armed,
government officials were compelled to establish a de facto
regime of consociationalism; and, eventually in the aftermath of a
disputed election, the government agreed to an extra-constitutional,
de jure regime that consociationally guaranteed one of
Afghanistan's largest minority communities a share of executive
power.
The first part of this story seems to support Arend Lijphart's
suggestion that if (a) you live in a divided democratizing society
where (b) there is no majority community or minority
communities have the power to disrupt society, and (c) if you have
choice between
to make
an
initial and permanent
consociationalism and incentivism, then consociationalism is
probably the least bad option. Indeed, in the immediate term, it is
the only viable solution. On the other hand, in contemporary
Afghanistan, as a long-term prospect, the least bad option appears
to be quite bad indeed. The poor performance of the new
consociational government supports Horowitz's view that
consociational governments rarely lead in the long-term to
effective, stable governance.
Neither consociationalists nor incentivists have 'cracked the
code' for constitutional design for post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's recent history suggests, instead, some interesting
but unsettling broad conclusions about constitutional design for
90 Lombardi & Pasarlay, supra note 20.
91 See Pasarlay, "Making the 2004 Constitution," supra note 40, chap. 4.
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divided societies. Apparently, each side in the consociationalist/
incentivist debate is correct to argue that the other's proposal is
unrealistic-at least as a permanent solution to the challenges of
governing a divided society. But, if both of the current options are
flawed, Afghanistan's suggests that there might be a productive,
alternative approach. While the answer of experimenting with
hybrids springs immediately to mind, the champions of each
approach have to date agreed that their approaches are mutually
exclusive, and nothing in Afghanistan's history suggests that they
are wrong. On the other hand, the fact that Afghanistan has
transitioned from one mode of governance to another reminds us
that perhaps one does not have to make an initial permanent
choice.
Based on the example of Afghanistan, it is probably unwise
to engage in constitutional deferral when it comes to the question
of basic governmental structure or on voting systems because it is
probably risky. But perhaps a pre-planned constitutional program
of sequencing may be useful - albeit not the type of sequencing
that Afghanistan has tried. Afghanistan needed consociationalism
to build trust and to build up habits of living together. But, having
achieved the consociational state that Afghanistan needed at the
outset, Afghans do not seem to have thought seriously about how
they might use a period of consociational governance to build trust
between communities sufficient that the country could transition
again back to an incentivist system that would be more stable in
the long-term. If the constitution had adopted consociational
guarantees along with a sunset provision, politicians could, in
theory, have established a habit of working with members of other
communities to provide for their constituents, while putting them
on notice that they would, within a fixed period of time, need to
appeal beyond their ethnic group. One cannot say for certain that
such an approach would have left Afghanistan in a better position
than it is now. But it is certainly possible, and it suggests a
possible approach to governing Afghanistan going forward.
The history of Afghanistan suggests that at different stages of
its political development the advantages of consociationalism are
likely to outweigh the advantages of incentivism and vice versa. If
consociationalism is the least bad option at the outset, it can
become the worst at some point in the future. If this is true, then
scholars should explore whether it is possible to develop
constitutions that would permit or even encourage transitions from
consociational government to incentivist government. It appears
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that scholars who want to develop effective approaches to
constitutional design should be asking questions about where, how,
and when transitions should occur. They should be asking: "what
sorts of countries are ones that, like Afghanistan, require
consociational government at the outset?;" "how can one draft a
constitution that ensures that consociational government does not
continue past the moment where its benefits outweigh its harms?;"
and "how should a transition from consociationalism to
incentivism take place, and on what schedule?."
If they do, their work may have practical ramifications for
Afghanistan. Afghans are now considering the possibility that they
may soon have to amend their constitution. 92 As they do, Afghans
could consider changes not only to formalize and legitimize the
consociational form of government that was negotiated and
established through an extra-legal 'power-sharing pact'; and, at the
same time, create sunset provisions according to which, after a
period of consociational governance (and, hopefully, stability),
Afghanistan would transition in relatively short order to an
incentivist system.

V. CONCLUSION
The history of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban
provides us with some insight into the merits of consociational vs.
incentivist approaches to governance in a divided society. The
insights are not entirely happy ones. It appears that Lijphart and
Horowitz have each identified fatal flaws in their rival's approach.
Lijphart is right to assume that in post-conflict states such as
Afghanistan, a country may have to be governed, at least in the
short term, in a consociational fashion. Horowitz is correct to say
that consociational government perpetuates and, in the
intermediate term, exacerbates the divisions that it was designed to
overcome, leading to paralyzing gridlock. While consociational
government may for a time be necessary, it contains the seeds of
its own destruction. In other words, in deeply divided societies
there may not be one system of government and voting that will
92 A. Constitutional Amendment Can Be on Agenda in Peace Process: HPC, TOLO
NEWS, Dec. 2, 2018,
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both (i) be recognized immediately as legitimate and trustworthy
by a broad cross-section of rival communities and (ii) be likely to
establish, over time, a track record of stable, effective governance
that is seen as legitimate and fair. Lest one become too pessimistic,
though, Afghanistan's recent history suggests that the question of
consociationalism vs. incentivism does not have to be a question
that is answered once and for all at the constitution's founding.
And perhaps it should not be. The solution to the quandary might
lie in sequencing.
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